Most accounts of the famous 1202 error reported by the AGC during landing of the Apollo 11 LM characterize the event as result of the successful operation of the AGC, flushing an resetting an overloaded computer while preserving critical data needed to proceed on restart.
However Alan Klumpp's retelling describes a situation in which overloading of the AGC could result in disaster:
...throttle and steering commands ... were often incompletely computed, and were queued for later completion. Any attempt to queue a command when the queue was already full (about five commands) would cause the computer to flush the queue and issue the alarm. But when the radar’s power supply was in phase, queued commands, valid only at some remote past time, could be completed and issued in reverse order, momentarily taking control to guide the LM off its normal landing trajectory. Although flushing commands would cause alarms, issuing faulty commands would not. Simulations showed that faulty commands could put the LM on a crash course, and guidance would attempt to take the LM to the landing site via a trajectory that passed beneath the lunar surface.
However, it's not clear when or if this situation actually occurred. Is this passage meant to confirm the general account: that the flushing behavior associated with a 1202 error prevented this disaster from occurring. Or is he saying that this could have been going on when the 1202 errors were reported, or at some other time during the mission? (In fact, one interpretation is that the out of phase overloading that triggered the 1202 errors insured against such a catastrophe.)
Did the 1202 error and associated reboot prevent disaster on Apollo 11 landing?