We know that radio waves are used in communication with rockets, space crafts and satellites. Now, radio system basically consists of transmitter and receiver. If there is frequency match between receiver and transmitter, then communication link is set up. But then, how is it possible to protect your satellite from unauthorised access by other countries on Earth who are able to produce similar/exact operating frequency radio waves matching the rocket components or space crafts? Is there some kind of encryption method to prevent such events?
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2$\begingroup$ related: Is secure communication in space important? and What, if any, mechanisms prevent unauthorized commands? and What's stopping space probe communication from being jammed? and Hijacked space data, notable instances of recovering images or other goodies from someone else's space mission? $\endgroup$– uhohCommented May 1, 2020 at 11:21
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2$\begingroup$ and Where can I find relevant papers describing the cryptographic algorithm(s) and/or techniques used within KY-171 and KY-172? and What information was stolen from JPL during the Raspberry Pi hack? and What Soviet signals (if any) attempted to scramble communication and sabotage Apollo missions? $\endgroup$– uhohCommented May 1, 2020 at 11:21
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1$\begingroup$ also in Security SE: What would one need to do in order to hijack a satellite? and Mars Curiosity Rover Security $\endgroup$– uhohCommented May 1, 2020 at 11:24
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$\begingroup$ Your assumptions are incorrect. First of all, look up "frequency hopping." But in any case, all or almost all modern systems are digital, not analog, and encryption happens in the digital data, not the carrier frequency. $\endgroup$– Carl WitthoftCommented May 1, 2020 at 11:46
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2$\begingroup$ The eponymous bad guy in "Dr. No," the first James Bond movie,* used radio communication equipment to disrupt rocket launches from Cape Canaveral. That movie was made in 1962, which probably means that real-life space agency engineers and officials probably were thinking about the problem even before then. $\endgroup$– Solomon SlowCommented May 1, 2020 at 16:47
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2 Answers
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At least for the Space Shuttle, commands to the orbiter from the ground were routinely encrypted.
Communications Security
Communications security (COMSEC) equipment provides the capability for encryption / decryption of operational data aboard the orbiter. The COMSEC equipment works with the NSPs to provide selectable transmit, receive, and record combinations under NSP mode control.
The NSP routes data of the indicated type through the COMSEC encryptor or decryptor as appropriate and gets the data back from the COMSEC line-replaceable unit encrypted or decrypted; if "BYP," the indicated data are handled directly by the NSP, and the COMSEC is bypassed.
The three ENCRYPTION switches on panel A1L provide power and routing control for encrypted data through the NSP. Our current operational mode is to use the COMSEC in the SELECT/RCV mode - only the uplink (voice and commands) is encrypted.
Shuttle Crew Operations Manual, page 2.4-9 Emphasis mine
Acronymology:
A1L - Orbiter panel in the aft left flight deck
BYP - Bypass
NSP - Network Signal Processor
RCV - Receive
Personal note: After the Department of Defense dropped out of the Space Shuttle program, the room containing this COMSEC equipment was the only classified, extra-security room in the Shuttle Mission Simulator building.
answered May 1, 2020 at 12:19
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Early satellites were not protected. In fact there was at least one case where satellite was lost because rogue radio transmission got into command link and at least another (Kosmos-785, 1975) where spontaneous error in transmission was misinterpreted as self-destruction command. Security through obscurity (and a need to use fairly expensive and bulky hardware to send a signal) might still be the only protection for many commercial satellites even today. For example, most communication satellites have very few (if none) protection from "unauthorized access" in data channels - these are dumb relays that send back to Earth anything that is sent up to satellite, so you actually can use someone's else comm sat to transmit your own data. The only downside is that you would need transmitter that would be powerful enough and everyone will soon start searching for source of rogue signal.
Of course many satellites (especially military ones) today are relying on encryption. There's also growing adoption of strong encryption for commercial satellites (CCSDS 352.0-B) and some efforts on standardization of COMSAT interfaces (CCSDS 355.0-B) led by the Consultative Committee for Space Data System. These standards are relatively new (2012-15) and decision to follow these is voluntary, but newer satellites are likely to use those.
Edited: added links to new standards pointed out by David Hammen
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$\begingroup$ I have heard that hijacking TV transponders on GEO satellites is (or at least was) big business! But your link doesn't mention "rogue radio transmission", it just says that two ground stations transmitted at the same time, rather than one after the other. Is there a more interesting story here? I've just asked Why were two simultaneous command transmissions interpreted by Kosmos 57 as an order to begin the descent? $\endgroup$– uhohCommented May 2, 2020 at 0:19
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$\begingroup$ I can't find the original but here's a copy: Satellite Jamming - Al Jazeera Documentary $\endgroup$– uhohCommented May 2, 2020 at 0:36
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2$\begingroup$ Re But there's no standard on how it's done. That is incorrect. The Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) has standards for exactly that. For example, see public.ccsds.org/Pubs/352x0b2.pdf . $\endgroup$ Commented May 2, 2020 at 9:03
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$\begingroup$ Thank you, @DavidHammen. Updated answer accordingly $\endgroup$ Commented May 2, 2020 at 15:56